Muthambi’s hostile takeover of the SABC

By Gavin Davis

In recent months we have seen an intensification of the Zuma faction’s campaign to capture key state institutions to protect the President from prosecution. The attempted purge of the Head of the Hawks, the National Director of Public Prosecutions and senior South African Revenue Service officials have sent a chill through our body politic.

While these stories were dominating the headlines, another attempt at state capture was insidiously underway. On 26 September last year, Zuma-loyalist and Communications Minister Faith Muthambi quietly signed a document giving her overarching control of the SABC. This Memorandum of Incorporation turns the SABC from a public broadcaster into a state broadcaster, completing the Zumafication of the SABC.

The Memorandum allows Muthambi to usurp the Board’s power in numerous ways, including giving her the right to veto any rule change proposed by the Board relating to the governance of the SABC. This is in clear contravention of the Broadcasting Act, which states that the Board “controls the affairs of the Corporation.”

The Memorandum also gives the Minister new powers to recommend the removal of Board Members. Again, this is in breach of the Broadcasting Act, which empowers only Parliament or the Board itself to recommend the removal of SABC Board Members.

Perhaps even more alarming is how the SABC Board’s authority over its Executive Directors (Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operations Officer and Chief Financial Officer) has been curtailed. The upshot is that Zuma’s henchman, Hlaudi Motsoeneng, is now untouchable at the SABC despite the numerous scandals that should have ended his career some time ago.

In terms of the Memorandum, Muthambi now has the power to make Motsoeneng the Acting CEO and keep him there for as long as she wishes. If Muthambi wants Motsoeneng to be appointed as the permanent CEO, she can waive the requirement that the position needs to be advertised and other candidates shortlisted. Then, if Muthambi wants to re-appoint Motsoeneng when his contract comes to an end, she can do so unilaterally.

If the Board decides it wants to discipline and/or suspend Motsoeneng, as the Public Protector directed it to do last year, Muthambi can now block the Board from doing so. And, to give Motsoeneng the best chance of surviving the DA’s court case challenging the legality of his appointment, the Memorandum makes the SABC liable to pay his legal fees.

All these amendments to the SABC’s Memorandum of Incorporation were made without discussion with the Board, and against the wishes of many Board Members. Meanwhile, Minister Muthambi has already begun using her newfound powers to bully Board Members who do not toe the line. In December last year she wrote to certain Board Members asking them to give her reasons not to have them removed from office. Board Members perceived as too independent are reportedly being targeted and victimised.

This Memorandum of Incorporation is only the first part of Muthambi’s plan to neuter the SABC Board. Shortly after assuming office last year, Muthambi raised eyebrows when she announced that she wishes to reduce the number of SABC Board Members and to change the way the Board is appointed. This year she will table legislation that will “clarify” her powers as Communications Minister, reduce the size of the board from 15 to 7 and revise what she calls the “current cumbersome process” of appointing the Board. Ominous indeed.

It is not an exaggeration to say that this ‘hostile takeover’ poses the gravest threat to SABC independence since 1994. But it must not be viewed in isolation. Make no mistake; the attempted seizure of independent state institutions is a concerted effort to protect one man. Our constitutional democracy has never looked so fragile.

Gavin Davis MP is the DA’s Shadow Minister of Communications. A version of this article was first published in the Daily Maverick on 11 February 2015.

The Zumafication of the SABC

By Gavin Davis

Hlaudi Motsoeneng is the ‘big man’ of the SABC – protected and promoted for protecting and promoting an even bigger man, President Jacob Zuma. But Hlaudi Motsoeneng is just the most visible manifestation of the ongoing ‘Zumafication’ of the public broadcaster. Behind the scenes, Zuma’s allies are attempting to construct a powerful propaganda machine that places the SABC at the centre of its plans to manipulate public opinion.

To be sure, the politicisation of the SABC started some time before the ascendance of Zuma. In the latter years of the Mbeki Presidency, the SABC increasingly took sides in the fierce factional battle between Mbeki and Zuma. Political commentators critical of Mbeki were blacklisted and candid documentaries on the President ended up on the cutting room floor. The SABC’s Head of News Snuki Zikalala made sure that footage of Zuma’s supporters booing the new Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, never made it on to the prime time news.

After Zuma’s election as State President in 2009, the ANC in Parliament rushed through the Broadcasting Amendment Bill. This enabled it to replace the SABC Board with an interim Board that would make executive appointments sympathetic to the Zuma faction. The interim Board’s first order of business was to appoint Solly Mokoetle as SABC group Chief Executive Officer.

In 2010, the Chairperson of the new SABC Board, Dr. Ben Ngubane (a Zuma appointee) connived with Mokoetle to appoint Phil Molefe as Head of News, without consulting the rest of the Board. Molefe did the job he was appointed for, telling senior executives at the SABC – allegedly at the instruction of Luthuli House – to stop giving favourable coverage to Mbeki.

In 2011, the Ngubane Board appointed Hlaudi Motsoeneng Acting COO of the SABC. Motsoeneng’s first brush with controversy had been back in 2007 when, as an Executive Producer at Lesedi FM, he was dismissed following charges of racism, dishonesty, and promoting staffers without following due process. Motsoeneng was re-appointed a year later by SABC Chief Executive Dali Mpofu in what was perceived as caving into pressure from the ascendant Zuma faction. This was not the last time that higher powers would come to Motsoeneng’s rescue.

In early 2013, the SABC Board resolved to dismiss Motsoeneng as Acting COO after he allegedly tried to interfere with the handling of an SIU investigation into SABC corruption dating back to 2008. Shortly after, SABC Board Chairperson Ben Ngubane unilaterally reversed the Board’s decision to dismiss Motsoeneng. In retaliation, the rest of the Board publicly reaffirmed its decision to dismiss Motsoeneng. The fall-out from this disagreement would lead to the resignation of Ngubane, along with most of the Board – allegedly at the behest of Luthuli House. The new interim Board immediately voted to reverse the decision to remove Motsoeneng as Acting COO. This was the second time that Motsoeneng was to miraculously survive at the SABC but not the last.

In November 2011 two senior SABC employees had requested a Public Protector investigation into various fraudulent activities involving Hlaudi Motsoeneng. The Public Protector’s report issued on 17 February 2014 made several damning findings, including that Motsoeneng:

  • Lied about having obtained a matric certificate in the application process;
  • Abused his power by having his salary increased three times in the space of one year, from R1.5 million to R2.4 million;
  • Was responsible for the unlawful appointment of Ms Sully Motsweni to various positions and for her subsequent unlawful salary increases;
  • “Purged” senior staff leading to “the avoidable loss of millions of Rand towards salaries…and settlements for irregular terminations of contracts”; and
  • Unilaterally increased some staff members’ salaries without following the SABC Personnel Regulations, leading to the SABC’s “unprecedented salary bill escalation by R29 million.”

The Public Protector directed the Board to take disciplinary action against Motsoeneng, to recover all wasteful expenditure incurred as a result of irregular salary increments and for the Minister to take urgent steps to find a new permanent COO.

None of this happened. Instead, at a SABC Board Meeting on 7 July the Board inexplicably recommended the appointment of Motsoeneng as COO in a permanent capacity. It was reported that prior to the meeting, Minister Faith Muthambi had arrived at the SABC and entered into a private conference with the SABC Chairperson, Ellen Tshabalala, who conveyed the Minister’s wishes to the Board. Minister Muthambi duly announced Motsoeneng’s appointment the next morning.

Motsoeneng had again survived at the SABC against all odds. For the third time, instead of being fired, he was protected and promoted by high-ranking ANC politicians. It is not hard to figure out why.

President Zuma has never been so embattled. Guptagate, Nkandlagate, Marikana, the arms deal and the spy tapes saga have cast a dark shadow over his presidency. Many in his own party hold him responsible for heavy electoral losses in the 2014 election.

This is why Zuma needs a loyalist at the heart of the SABC to help him survive the inevitable internal backlash.

Motsoeneng is often referred to as Zuma’s “conduit” by SABC staff. Indeed, he has been known to boast about his strong ties to President Zuma and it has been suggested that he ensured favourable SABC coverage for Zuma to head off Kgalema Motlanthe’s challenge for the ANC presidency at Mangaung. When Zuma was booed at Nelson Mandela’s funeral, Motsoeneng saw to it that the spectacle – widely reported on at home and abroad – never made it on to prime time SABC news bulletins. The parallels with the SABC’s non-coverage of the Mlambo-Ngcuka booing incident some ten years earlier are striking.

Motsoeneng is the perfect lieutenant to ensure positive reportage of the President – ruthless, calculating and willing to abuse power to achieve his ends. But it would be a mistake to think that President Zuma’s plan to control the airwaves ends with Hlaudi Motsoeneng.

Government sources suggested in May this year that President Zuma was waiting until after the election to establish an Orwellian-sounding ‘Information Ministry’. On 16 July, the President proclaimed that the old Department of Communications would become the new Department of Telecommunications and Post. The SABC would move to a newly constituted Department of Communications that would include the Government and Communication Information System (GCIS) previously housed in the Presidency. Ominously, ICASA – the regulator of the SABC – is also under the aegis of the new Department, along with the Film & Publications Board with its far-reaching powers to proscribe the publication and distribution of sensitive material.

This proclamation gives the new Minister of Communications – Zuma loyalist Faith Muthambi – unprecedented influence over crafting and disseminating the government’s message. Shortly after assuming office, Muthambi announced that she would be reducing the number of SABC Board Members from 12 to 5, and transferring Parliament’s powers to hire and fire the Board to herself. Her role in the appointment of Motsoeneng confirmed her complicity in the ongoing politicisation of the SABC.

Hlaudi Motsoeneng is the personification of a renewed and far-reaching assault on the SABC’s independence. But his protection and promotion is just one component of a plan to ensure that the entire state communication apparatus sends out a positive message about Zuma’s track record – a “good story to tell” in ANC parlance. The Zumafication of the SABC should be of concern to every South African with an interest in protecting our constitutional democracy. Indeed, it is going to take the collective effort of the media, civil society and political parties to stop it.

Gavin Davis MP is the DA’s Shadow Minister of Communications. This is an edited version of a forthcoming article in Focus, the journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation.

No wonder viewers are switching off

By Gavin Davis

The splitting up of the former Department of Communications has raised many questions. But the most important question is “why”? And more specifically, “why now”?

The answer is purely political.

The fact is that the ANC is losing its grip on power. It recorded its worst-ever election result this year. The party dropped in Gauteng by 10 percentage points; and at the next local election, the ANC is in danger of losing three cities.

To survive the next five years, President Jacob Zuma needs a good story to tell. And he needs all the help he can get to tell it.

So when the president appointed the cabinet in May, he really put his Faith in communications. And, make no mistake, Minister Muthambi is a very strategic deployment.

In her first few weeks in office, we have learned that the minister wants to create what she calls a “professional army of communicators” to bring about an “information revolution”.

The minister has been at pains to deny that this is a propaganda ministry. But her constant criticism of the media suggests otherwise. Last year, she castigated the media because it dared “to publish negative news on government, disregarding the good service delivery record of government”.

The minister rehashed this line a few weeks after assuming her cabinet post: “I will be the happiest person if we can have a situation where every South African is informed about what government is doing. There are people out there doing good, but the story is not being told.”

Clearly, the minister thinks it is her job to tell this good story, with public money.

The Government Communications Information System (GCIS) will now be working much more closely with the SABC, under the aegis of one minister. It is this arrangement, more than anything else, which signals the SABC’s shift from public to state broadcaster.

It must be of some concern to the minister that fewer people are watching and listening to the SABC than ever before.

Internal research commissioned by the SABC (which was quickly buried) has shown that the key reason for declining audiences is the perception that the public broadcaster is partisan.

It is not hard to see why. Over the last few years we have seen the appointment of SABC boards stacked with ANC deployees. We have witnessed opposition party adverts being banned from SABC TV at election time. We have heard that SABC journalists are under surveillance and their phones are being monitored.

Last but not least, we have seen the rise and rise of Hlaudi Motsoeneng. This is a man who interferes in editorial decisions, who says that 70 percent of the news must be “happy news”, and who says journalists should be licensed. It is an indictment of the SABC that his rise through the ranks has gone unchecked.

If the minister wants to regain lost viewers and listeners, she needs to show in word – and deed – that she is committed to protecting the SABC’s independence. But, instead, she has already done the precise opposite. Since assuming office, the minister has given the impression that the SABC must compensate for negative stories in the press. She has said that she wants to give herself absolute power to hire and fire the SABC board. And, inexplicably, she has protected and promoted Motsoeneng when he should have been fired.

No wonder people are switching channels.

But where do they go? Most people cannot afford satellite television. The big commercial radio stations don’t have the reach of the SABC radio stations.

This is where the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA) can play an important role. This year, the MDDA will transfer R34.4 million in state funds to community and small commercial media. And, in collaboration with the GCIS, will ensure that R30m, or 12 percent of all government adspend, goes to supporting community media.

On the face of it, this appears to be a noble objective.

But the question is: can community media be truly independent if most of its funding – through advertising and grants – comes from the government?

When former GCIS chief executive Jimmy Manyi centralised all government adspend in the GCIS, he threatened newspapers that he would pull government advertising if they did not toe the government line. His recent appointment to the MDDA board is therefore an ominous development of concern to everybody who cares about the independence and sustainability of community media.

Each entity in this new department is a cog in a powerful propaganda machine. Taken together, they give the minister enormous influence over national television, radio and community media – either through direct control or dependency on state funding and government adspend.

There is nothing wrong with a government communication system that informs people of their rights, and the services they are entitled to. What must be rejected is the creation of a propaganda machine obsessed with telling people “good stories” about government.

The jobless and the poverty-stricken are not interested in the government’s “good stories”. They want good governance, good service delivery and good jobs.

And they want a government that spends its budget on fixing problems, not on trying to spin its way out of them.

Gavin Davis MP is the DA’s Shadow Minister of Communications. This is an edited version of a speech delivered in the Department of Communications Budget Vote Debate. It was published in The Star on 17 July 2014.


The anatomy of a hollow liberal mythology

By Gavin Davis

The first thing they teach you at journalism school is that objectivity is an impossible goal, but one you should strive for nonetheless.

Gareth van Onselen is a strident critic of the ANC who also happens to be a former DA staff member. He would lose all credibility if he were to only criticise the ANC, so he makes sure that he balances things out by writing the odd critical piece on the DA.

There is not too much wrong with this, except for one thing. His knowledge of the inner workings of the DA, residual loyalties to certain party insiders and his own unhappy parting of ways with the party mean that he cannot write with any semblance of objectivity when it comes to matters involving the DA.

It is obvious to anybody familiar with the DA that Van Onselen selectively targets certain individuals in the party in his articles. His relentless attacks on Gauteng Premier Candidate Mmusi Maimane, for example, border on the obsessive.

column critical of Helen Zille’s role in the Employment Equity Amendment Bill saga is the latest example of this selective targeting. Zille is singled out for criticism (even though she had the guts to admit the mistake), while those directly responsible for the systems failure that caused the mistake are barely mentioned. Van Onselen argues that the DA’s initial support for the Bill was not due to the systems failure at all, but rather as a result of ideological drift at the centre of the party.

However, this argument quickly falls apart when one considers the correspondence (now in the public domain) which shows that both Zille and myself argued as far back as May that the DA must oppose this Bill on ideological grounds. Our argument to oppose the Employment Equity Amendment Bill was based entirely on long-held values of the DA – a commitment to non-racialism, reconciliation, redress and a priority to grow the economy and create jobs. Indeed, these are the values that underpin the DA’s Green Paper on Economic Inclusion published on 9 September this year. That this policy framework was not used as the basis for the DA’s deliberations on the Bill and subsequent vote in the National Assembly, is inexcusable and inexplicable. But it had nothing to do with ideological drift, as Van Onselen asserts.

I have written previously on the “self-appointed custodians of liberalism” who think they have a monopoly on the DA’s values, and try to shut down anybody who disagrees with them. Perhaps these are the same people that Van Onselen refers to when he writes longingly of a time in recent DA history when:

“A small group of people guarded its principles and values jealously and, more often than not, acted as a bulwark against any fundamental encroachment of the DA’s core political philosophy. As its borders become more porous and as it desperately seeks to better fit into that hostile environment, it has allowed into its ranks a series of people not fundamentally liberal.”

Van Onselen goes on to lament the departure of former party strategist Ryan Coetzee who “understood well that the party must broaden its appeal but never at the expense of its liberal values.”

A closer reading of  party history, however, shows that this notion of past DA liberal purity is more fiction than fact.

I will never forget a DP rally I attended as a student in Booysen’s Park in the Northern Areas of Port Elizabeth back in 1999. The gathering was addressed by party leader Tony Leon who gave a characteristically forceful speech entitled ‘Every Minority Deserves a Place in the Sun’. I vividly recall the audience members decked out in both Democratic Party and National Party T-shirts. When I asked a woman why she was wearing an NP T-shirt at a DP rally, she hesitated for a moment before exclaiming: “Dis dieselfde!” 

Those were the days of the DP’s ‘Fight Back’ campaign – an aggressive election strategy to lure conservative voters away from the New National Party by stoking minority fears. As Tony Leon told an analyst on the campaign trail: “The DP does not care where its support comes from, as long as it obtains it.”[i]

Sadly, this appetite for votes did not extend to townships where the DP was conspicuous by its absence. A long-standing liberal supporter  summed it up at a DP election meeting in Grahamstown when he said that the party “may have the guts to fight back, but it does not have the guts to put up Xhosa posters.”[ii]

The ‘Fight Back’ campaign certainly worked to broaden the DA’s appeal beyond a handful of liberal mostly English-speaking white South Africans. But did it do so without compromising the DP’s liberal values? That is open to debate. To my mind, it is difficult to reconcile a campaign aimed exclusively at minorities with the party’s historical commitment to non-racialism and reconciliation.

The DP’s merger with the National Party a year later in 2000 certainly did compromise the party’s liberal ethos. It was the culmination of a strategy mapped out by Leon when he took over as DP Leader from Zach de Beer back in 1994.

Leon said at the time:

“Victory does not belong to the faint of heart. We must not be too fastidious, precious or prissy. Certainly not if we are to attract the numbers we need to make a difference. And we must make deals and arrangements, even pacts, wherever and whenever it will be to our advantage, and will cause our support to be maximised.”[iii]

Van Onselen might argue that the small group of people at the centre who jealously guarded the party’s liberal values acted as a bulwark against any nationalist encroachment. But this does not stand up to any real scrutiny. The very act of merging with a nationalist party whose ethos informed apartheid was a betrayal of the DP’s values. What is more, a  ‘free vote’ in Parliament on issues of conscience such as abortion, the death penalty and gay marriage (dating from the days of the Progressive Federal Party) meant that the nationalists in the caucus never had to align themselves with the liberal position on these issues.

Ironically, a few years after the break-up of the alliance with the NP, Tony Leon announced his own support for the death penalty at a 2004 election campaign stop in the Free State. The announcement was met with horror by liberal stalwarts and party grandees, including Helen Suzman. Prominent liberal thinker David Welsh accused the DA of a “blatant piece of political opportunism, masquerading behind the fig-leaf of a free vote.” For its part, the National Party was furious that Leon had encroached so far on to its electoral turf. The NP said in a statement that Leon’s “opportunism knew no end” and that he “knows full well that the DA as a party does not support the death penalty.”

One can only wonder where the “small group of people” who jealously guarded the party’s values and principles were on that particular day.

Perhaps the next time Van Onselen writes that “the centre is not as focused on principle as it used to be”, more people will see through the mythology he is intent on trying to create. The truth is that the Progressive Party, the Democratic Party and the Democratic Alliance have never been, to use Tony Leon’s words, a “pristine political priesthood”.

It is certainly strange that Van Onselen is silent about the triumph of pragmatism over principle that characterised the DP’s bid to attract conservative minority voters. And yet, when the DA of today allows a traditional leader to take up membership, or when a DA candidate mentions ubuntu in a speech, Van Onselen decries it as a fundamental breach of the party’s liberal values.

Perhaps it is Van Onselen’s own peculiar prejudice against African culture that causes him to worry more about the party’s growth now than he did in the past.  As he wrote in April this year: “African culture in general and South African culture in particular is a nationalist one – it has at its heart group identity, in various different guises (race through ethnicity).”

It is nonsense that African culture and liberalism are fundamentally incompatible. If they were, then the DA might as well shut up shop. Cultures and ideologies are not immutable or single-faceted; they are shaped by ongoing debates and shifting contexts. It is therefore quite conceivable for a person to self-identify as an African and a liberal. Indeed, many people are starting to do so.

As the DA grapples with electoral growth in the context of a plural society, we must be mindful of the balance that needs to be struck between principle and pragmatism. Just as we must never allow expedience to dictate our position on issues, we must never allow ourselves to be held up to a hollow myth of past ideological purity either. If we do, we will fail in our mission to build a liberal, non-racial alternative in South Africa.

Gavin Davis is Director of Communications at the Democratic Alliance. This article was first published on Politicsweb on 13 November 2013


[i] South African Election Update, Electoral Institute of South Africa, November 1998 – June 1999.

[ii] Unpublished report on a Democratic Party meeting by Megan Addis, 7 April 1999 St George’s Hall, Grahamstown.

[iii] Tony Leon, ‘Acceptance Speech as DP leader: charting a new course and keeping faith with values’, Durban 23 October 1994

Khayelitsha: an unfolding scholastic success story

By Gavin Davis

In the early 1950s, South Africa’s minister of native affairs, Hendrik Verwoerd, said: “What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice?”

This deep-seated prejudice drove the apartheid policy that denied black children the same standard of education as white pupils. Today the legacy of Bantu education continues to haunt policymakers tasked with providing a decent education to children whose parents were denied it in the past.

Despite spending a fifth of its national budget on education (and disproportionately more on “previously-disadvantaged” schools), the hard reality is that South Africa is not producing enough matriculants who can read, write and calculate at the levels required to compete in the global economy. This is clear from South Africa’s underperformance in international benchmark tests such as the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study.

High rates of teacher and pupil absenteeism, strike action, administrative bungling, unqualified teachers, crumbling infrastructure and a shortage of textbooks are often cited to paint a picture of an education system in irreversible decline. But beyond the doom and gloom, there are places where a different story is emerging.

Khayelitsha, on the outskirts of Cape Town, is one of the largest and fastest-growing townships in South Africa. Established in the early 1980s, it is now home to around half a million people. Many migrated here from other provinces in search of jobs and a better life. Despite free basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation, unemployment, poverty, overcrowding and violent crime persist.

When it comes to education, however, the narrative is slowly changing. The Centre for Science and Technology (COSAT)—a specialist maths and science secondary school in Khayelitsha—became the first township school to be placed in the top ten schools in the Western Cape for the National Senior Certificate (NSC) examinations in 2011.

A rigorous selection process based on each child’s potential to do well in maths, science and information technology is partly responsible for COSAT’s success. Money plays a role too. Though parents pay a small fee, the state and, crucially, private sector donors pay most of the additional funding which ensures that the school has up-to-date equipment, learning materials and—most importantly—qualified teachers who care deeply about helping children to succeed.


The COSAT story has been well documented in South Africa and abroad. What far fewer people have noticed is the steady but undeniable improvement in the other 20 (non-specialist) secondary schools in Khayelitsha over the last few years.

In 2009 the average pass rate for the NSC examinations in Khayelitsha schools was 53.6%. By 2012 it had risen to 70.2%, not far off the national pass rate of 73.9%. Even more encouraging is the concomitant decline in the number of “underperforming” (an NSC pass rate of 60% or less) Khayelitsha schools from 15 in 2009 to just four in 2012.

Behind these numbers are individual schools that have shown phenomenal improvement in a very short time. Take Matthew Goniwe Memorial High School, for example. In 2009 this school was struggling with a matric pass rate of just 45.5%. Last year, 84.2% of the pupils who wrote the NSC passed—a full ten percentage points above the national pass rate. Iqhayiya Secondary and Chris Hani Secondary showed similar improvements. Iqhayiya’s pass rate was 75.6% last year, up from 34.6% in 2009. Chris Hani went from 44.2% in 2009 to 83.3% in 2012.

Some education experts argue that the pass rate is a crude measure of school performance, that it is open to manipulation by schools that hold back weaker pupils from writing the NSC examinations. For this reason, other performance measures need to be taken into account, such as the total number of students who wrote and passed the NSC examinations, and how many did well enough to gain admission to university.

In 2012, 54 fewer Khayelitsha pupils wrote the NSC examinations than in 2009. But over the same period, 500 more Khayelitsha pupils passed the NSC examinations: 2,038 in 2012 compared with 1,538 in 2009. Of those who passed, 584 qualified for university entrance, compared with just 305 in 2009.

What is behind the improvement in Khayelitsha schooling in the last three years? “It’s nothing sexy or dramatic,” says Clive Roos, special adviser to the Western Cape’s education minister. “The department simply got its house in order.”

According to Roos, in 2009 the incoming minister inherited an “ad hoc amalgam of peculiar things”. “The mere fact of having a plan changed everything completely,” he says.

One of the first components of the new plan was a focus on appointing good principals in underperforming schools because, as Roos puts it, “If the principal is not right, the chances of turning a school around are significantly reduced.” So, for the first time, the Western Cape Education Department began exercising its prerogative to improve the choices of school governing bodies, with roughly a quarter of principal appointments queried on the basis of competence in the first year.

Another early intervention was setting a pass rate target for each school and publicising it. “Three years ago, when the minister visited a school, the principal often didn’t know their own school’s pass rate. Now it is the first thing that gets discussed,” says Roos. Once the target is set, each principal is expected to draw up a tailored School Improvement Plan or SIP with the school governing body. The SIP is the department’s online management tool that monitors key performance indicators such as: the number of students on the nutrition and transport programmes; the average number of absent days per pupil and teacher; and the number of meetings held with parents to discuss their child’s academic performance.

Khayelitsha has also benefited from a strategy launched in 2010 to provide extra support to every underperforming school in the province, according to Bronagh Casey, spokesperson in the Western Cape’s education ministry. The plan includes providing textbooks to all grade 12 students in their six core subjects, extra tutoring over weekends and school holidays and broadcasting extra lessons to schools via satellite.

There is no question that Bantu education’s legacy will continue to be felt in South Africa for the foreseeable future. What the Khayelitsha story shows is that a well thought out plan that emphasises accountability, departmental support and appointing the right people can improve school performance in a short space of time.

Gavin Davis is Communications Director at the Democratic Alliance. This article was first published in the September 2013 issue of Africa in Fact, the journal of Good Governance Africa and republished in City Press, 25 August 2013.

The rise of social media in African politics

By Gavin DavisFacebook Africa

Opposition parties in Africa have struggled for decades in a media environment that favours incumbents. Of 54 African countries measured in the Freedom House 2012 press freedom index, only five were considered to be “free”. Press censorship and pliant public broadcasters mean that elections can be fixed before the first vote is counted.

State control of the media is not the only hurdle preventing parties from getting their message to the electorate. Many face the invidious choice of either giving journalists “petrol money” or having their press conference ignored. “It’s a pity that, as the party advocating for a corruption-free society, we find ourselves embroiled in this vice,” says Kasekende Bashir of the Liberal Democratic Transparency (LDT) party in Uganda.

Social media have the power to change all this by permitting parties to bypass the gatekeepers—reporters, editors and government officials—who shape or control the press agenda. The Arab spring in 2010–11 revealed how social networks such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube revolutionised political communication in North Africa.

In Africa only about 16% of the population have internet access—less than half of the world average of 34%, according to Internet World Stats, an online demography site. A shortage of electricity and broadband infrastructure, coupled with the high cost of hardware to access the internet, mean that most African countries find themselves on the wrong side of the global digital divide.

The good news is that a mobile revolution is sweeping the continent and bridging this gap. More Africans have access to a mobile phone than clean drinking water, according to Jan Hutton, telecoms director at Nielsen, a market-research firm. After Asia, Africa is the world’s largest mobile phone market, with 700m mobile connections. By 2016, there will be 1 billion—a mobile phone for nearly every person, according to a 2012 report by financial services firms Frontier Advisory and Deloitte.

While not every mobile phone has social networking capabilities, this is changing too. At the end of 2012, smartphone users accounted for 6% of Africa’s total mobile subscriptions; this share is forecast to rise to 18% by 2017, according to Thecla Mbongue, a senior analyst at Informa Telecoms and Media, a market-research firm.

Once mobile take-up reaches critical mass, social media may well become the only game in town. Many political parties realise that they need to be ahead of the game now if they are to win votes in the future.

At a conference on political communication held in Cape Town in November 2012, opposition parties from the Seychelles to South Sudan highlighted the rising significance of social media in their communications strategies. All agreed that starting the right conversations on social media and steering engaged followers in the right direction are the keys to future success. These online conversations among many individuals are gradually supplanting the one-way “broadcast model” of communications.

In Botswana voters no longer trust the media and are turning to social networks for their news, reported Winfred Rasina, spokesman for the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD). He spends an average of two-and-a-half hours daily updating the BMD’s Facebook page and interacting with potential voters.

Only 7% of its citizens access the internet, according to the International Telecommunication Union. But “Botswana has a population of only 2m people, which means that word of mouth travels quickly,” he says.

Trust in traditional media is in decline, particularly among the youth, says Fungisai Sithole, chief of staff of the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe.

“The current generation does not want to be treated as the ‘other’. They want to be engaged, they want to talk, they want to contribute,” she says. To get around the drawback of low internet access and the high cost of smartphones, the party has developed a bespoke platform that uses text messages to interact with voters and members.

Another party finding innovative ways to reach the electorate is the Civic United Front (CUF) in Tanzania. It has linked its social media platforms with popular youth websites and trained a team of young activists to respond to issues.

Abdul Kambaya, CUF’s national director for publicity, says that the success of this strategy is evident from the response it has elicited from its opponents: the party’s website was hacked and completely destroyed six months ago.

This is a cautionary tale. As more people begin to use social media for political engagement, so too will governments increase their efforts to curtail it. Finding ways to circumvent state censorship with sophisticated social media strategies will be a key objective for African opposition parties in the years ahead.

The mobile revolution is a potential game-changer in Africa, where media gatekeepers have exerted too much power for too long. Once the social media groundswell breaks, a political tipping point may well follow.

Gavin Davis is Communications Director at the Democratic Alliance.This article was originally published in the May 2013 issue of ‘Africa in Fact’, the journal of Good Governance Africa and republished in Rhodes Journalism Review, no. 33, 2013)

For liberalism to succeed we must dispense with dogma

By Gavin Davis

Democratic Alliance insiders have long identified a serious threat to our project: the proliferation of DA members whose own values are fundamentally at odds with the party.

We must be wary of those who see the DA merely as a platform for publicity or a path to power. There is no point winning elections if we cannot implement a programme of action grounded in our vision of an open, opportunity society for all.

At the same time we must be aware of those who use the spectre of ‘illiberal tendencies’ to shut down legitimate debate and discredit people. Such bullying tactics are the hallmark of authoritarianism, not liberalism.

Alan Paton once described liberalism as “a generosity of spirit, a tolerance of others, an attempt to comprehend otherness…” His point was that, besides a commitment to the rule of law and individual freedom, liberalism is about empathy, mutual respect and the ability to see other people’s points of view.

For liberals, this means dispensing with the dogma and grappling with some of the great questions we face, such as: what does it mean to be a liberal in Africa? Is there a place for notions of community within the liberal framework? Are liberalism and religion compatible? The list is endless.

The DA’s National Spokesperson Mmusi Maimane attempted to tackle one such question in an opinion piece published in the Sunday Times this week. In it, he interrogated the concept of ‘Africanness’ and its place in our democratic discourse following Jackson Mthembu’s attack on Lindiwe Mazibuko.

Maimane argued that nobody has the right to unilaterally decide or prescribe what is or what isn’t African. Furthermore, traditions and cultures are constantly evolving and, as such, are open to the interpretation of each individual.

Maimane went on to say that his identity as an African comes from a sense of shared history and an emotional connection to the continent. He argued that, for him, the idea of Ubuntu sums up his Africanness and that, in his view, being African means being part of a community.

That is how Mmusi Maimane chooses to self-identify as an African. He was not forcing his identity on anybody else; he was stating what Africanness means to him.

When Barack Obama talks about something “inherent in the American spirit”, nobody accuses him of being illiberal. Likewise, when Nick Clegg talks of inculcating an inclusive, positive British identity, his liberal credentials are not questioned.

And yet a former DA staffer suggested in his blog yesterday that Maimane’s column signalled the erosion of the DA’s liberal values on the grounds that:

  1. Maimane suggested that ‘Africanness’ was a uniform, immutable concept
  2. There is no such thing as Ubuntu and, if there was, it would be anathema to liberalism
  3. There is no such thing as community, that it is an artificial abstraction incompatible with liberalism

The first argument is intellectually dubious because Maimane explicitly rails against uniform notions of Africanness, asking: “What right does Mthembu or anyone else have to prescribe identity to others?” Maimane’s intention was to describe what Africanness means to him without being prescriptive. To suggest otherwise is dishonest.

The second argument is worth having. It is true that the concept of Ubuntu is ill-defined. But, because of this, it is difficult to ascertain whether it is compatible with liberalism or not. Since both concepts are open to contestation (even if liberalism is far better defined), it is feasible for a person to self-identify as a liberal who believes in Ubuntu.

The third argument was the subject of fierce academic debate between communitarians and liberals in the 1980s. It fizzled out when somebody made the point that one could be an individual in the context of a defined community – as long as group rights were not permitted to override individual rights.

Like Africanness, liberalism cannot be defined and prescribed by any one individual because – for one thing – it is not static. Liberalism is constantly evolving, particularly as it is applied in new contexts on our continent and across the world.

This is something that liberals should celebrate and not feel threatened by. Pluralism gives rise to debate and introspection. It brings a freshness and energy that invigorates our project.

We must guard against self-appointed custodians of liberalism unilaterally deciding what liberalism is and what it isn’t, and who is in and who is out. If we do not, you can be sure that authoritarianism will follow.

Gavin Davis is Communications Director at the Democratic Alliance. This article appeared in Politicsweb on 22 January 2013.